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COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS- CONTRACTUAL LIMITATIONS OF LIABIL-
ITY-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-SECTION 402A-The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that under
Pennsylvania law, in cases involving solely consequential damages
without actual physical harm to person or property, an injured
party's remedy is under the Uniform Commercial Code and section
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts is inapplicable.
Posttape Associates v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir.
1976).
Plaintiff Posttape Associates, a limited partnership,' was formed
to produce a documentary film on group-encounter therapy.
Through one of its partners, it purchased 105 rolls of Eastman Ek-
tachrome commercial movie film from Eastman Kodak for the pro-
duction.2 Each cannister of film bore a clause which purported to
limit Kodak's liability for any defect, caused by negligence or other
fault, to the replacement of the film.' Posttape used the film, and
when it was processed, scratches appearing on the film surface made
it commercially unusable.' Attempts to correct the damage were
unsuccessful.'
Posttape commenced suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,' alleging that the defects in
1. Posttape, Inc. was a two-man partnership which was a fifty percent partner in plaintiff,
Posttape Associates. See Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 F.R.D. 323, 332 n.6
(E.D. Pa. 1975). Posttape, Inc. was formed for the express purpose of producing the documen-
tary. Id. at 325.
2. Id.
3. The limitation clause was affixed to the metal cannisters which contained the film.
Each metal cannister was placed in an individual box which also bore the limitation clause.
The clause was not found on the larger boxes containing the film when delivered, nor did the
clause appear on the purchase order or the shipping document. Id. at 332 n.6. The limitation
clause read as follows:
READ THIS NOTICE
This film will be replaced if defective in manufacture, labeling or packaging, or if
damaged or lost by us or any subsidiary company even though by negligence or other
fault. Except for such replacement, the sale, processing, or other handling of this film
for any purpose is without warranty or liability. Since color dyes may change in time,
this film will not be replaced for, or otherwise warranted against, any change in color.
Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir. 1976).
4. The defect in the film had occurred during manufacture. 68 F.R.D. at 326.
5. Id.
6. 387 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Federal jurisdiction was based upon diversity of
citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), Posttape being a Pennsylvania partnership and Kodak,
a New Jersey corporation. The parties agreed that Pennsylvania law controlled this case.
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the film were due to Kodak's negligence, that Kodak breached war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC), and that Kodak breached its duties under section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts The plaintiff sought
consequential damages in the form of lost profits.' Based on the
jury's answers to special interrogatories on liability,9 the district
court entered judgment in favor of Posttape on both the section
402A cause of action and claims under the UCC.'0 In addition to
concluding that Kodak was negligent in the manufacture of the
film, the jury found that under the UCC there had not been an
effective limitation of damages." The jury awarded Posttape dam-
ages which included lost profits. Kodak appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing, inter alia,
that under Pennsylvania law section 402A has no place in an action
for consequential damages arising out of a purely commercial trans-
action.'" The Third Circuit agreed and unanimously reversed the
district court's decision.
The primary issue addressed by the court of appeals was whether
7. 537 F.2d at 753. Section 402A provides in part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
8. See 537 F.2d at 753. Posttape argued that the nature of the movie, a nude documentary,
required that timing be carefully planned in regard to its release so as to take advantage of
the peak of the public's interest. It felt that the delay resulting from the defective film caused
the company to lose profits because an allegedly similar film was released prior to Posttape's
film and captured a lion's share of the potential market. Brief for Appellee at 6-7, Posttape
Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976).
9. The jury found that Kodak had been negligent in the manufacture of the film, that
the film had been in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the property of Post-
tape, and that the parties did not intend to limit liability to the replacement of the film.
Thus, they found Kodak liable on both counts: breach of warranty under the U.C.C. § 2-715
and strict liability under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A. 537 F.2d at 754.
10. See note 9 supra. In the damage phase of the trial, the jury determined that Posttape
was entitled to $143,000 in damages, a large portion of the award being profits which Posttape
allegedly lost as a result of the defects in the film. Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion
for Judgment N.O.V. at 4, Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 F.R.D. 323 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
11. 68 F.R.D. at 331.
12. Brief for Appellant at 26-28, Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751
(3d Cir. 1976).
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402A liability arises in a commercial transaction where goods are
defective, the buyer seeks consequential damages-here lost prof-
its-and there is no actual physical harm to persoff or property. In
the alternative, the court considered whether the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, adopted by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1953, was
solely to govern commercial transactions where only consequential
damages were sought. 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had in-
corporated section 402A into the state's common law in Webb v.
Zern,"4 subsequent to the legislature's adoption of the UCC.' 5 Al-
though Judge Weis acknowledged that 402A is the superior theory
of recovery to compensate the average consumer for personal injury
or property damage caused by a defective product,'" he emphasized
that the transaction at issue in Posttape was between two business
entities involving a claim for consequential damages due to a defec-
tive product. The damages sought were strictly economic in nature
and arose from a nondangerous impairment of the quality of the
product."
The Posttape court had difficulty discerning Pennsylvania's posi-
tion in cases involving consequential damages where 402A liability
13. The court of appeals also dealt with other contentions of error. Kodak argued that the
exclusion of evidence of insurance to show Posttape's knowledge of Kodak's limitation of
damages was improper, and that the refusal of the trial judge to charge the jury on the issue
of Posttape's knowledge of the custom of limitation of damages was error. The Third Circuit
agreed with both of these contentions, thereby necessitating a retrial of the UCC issue on
remand.
14. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). See text accompanying notes 28 & 29 infra. For the
text of section 402A see note 7 supra.
15. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (Purdon 1970).
16. 537 F.2d at 755.
17. Kodak conceded liability for the replacement of the film. The controversy concerned
Posttape's claim for consequential damages which were alleged as lost profits and increased
expenses due to the reshooting of the film. Brief for Appellants at 6, Posttape Assocs. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976). The Posttape court noted that even Chief
Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court of California, an ardent supporter of section 402A in
most situations, favors application of the UCC in cases such as Posttape. See 537 F.2d at 755,
citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (402A
liability is limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery under a theory of
strict liability for economic loss alone). See also Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability
Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Franklin], discussing Justice Traynor's opinion in Seely. Not all juris-
dictions have followed the reasoning of Chief Justice Traynor. See, e.g., Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207.A.2d 305 (1965). Without mentioning § 402A, but
characterizing the ruling as an application of strict liability, the court permitted damages for
the sale of a defective rug even though there was no physical injury.
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is asserted."5 Although in Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp."
the opinion of the court intimated that it may not be necessary to
prove an unreasonably dangerous condition in order to recover
under section 402A,20 a majority of the supreme court justices re-
fused to join in rejecting the unreasonably dangerous prerequisite in
a strict liability action.2' Therefore, the requirement was still viable
in Pennsylvania.23 Since in cases where merely consequential dam-
ages were sought there is no evidence from which a jury could con-
clude that the product was unreasonably dangerous-that it caused
physical harm to person or property-the court of appeals held that
it was error for the district court to submit the question of 402A
liability to the jury. In the Third Circuit's view, 402A has no place
in an action for consequential damages arising out of a nondanger-
ous defect in the quality of a product.23 Such cases fall within the
scope of the Uniform Commercial Code, which should play the pre-
dominant role in controlling the relationship of the parties to a
commercial sales transaction.24 The UCC expressly deals with pur-
ported limitations of damages and sets forth criteria which are to
be used by the courts in determining the validity of an attempted
18. Although the Pennsylvania courts have never directly faced this issue, at least one
circuit court, applying Pennsylvania law, has relied on policy justifications for finding that
§ 402A is not applicable to a commercial sales transaction. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013, 1020-21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970).
Accord, Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Iowa Elec.
Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1973)(strict
liability is unavailable as a remedy for economic loss unaccompanied by personal or property
damage).
19. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) (Jones, C.J., & Nix, J.) (when an actual defect is
proven, the purpose of the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification has been met, thus mak-
ing a charge to the jury on "unreasonably dangerous" unnecessary and improper).
20. Id. at 97, 337 A.2d at 898.
21. Chief Justice Jones' opinion announcing the decision of the court was concurred in
only by Justice Nix, with the remaining five justices concurring in the result.
22. See Bair v. American Motors Corp., 535 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1976); Beron v. Kramer-
Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1276-77 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976)
(construing Berkebile as having no precedential value since only two justices concurred in
the opinion). Both opinions relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rationale in Com-
monwealth v. Little, 432 Pa. 256, 248 A.2d 32 (1968), where the court held that an opinion in
which only two justices concurred was not binding.
23. 537 F.2d at 755.
24. The court remanded the case for a new trial with respect to the alleged agreement to
limit the extent of damages. The issue was to be resolved under the Uniform Commercial
Code. The UCC issue was to be retried due to errors in the trial court proceedings which did
not go to the issue of damages, but to the question of the existence of an actual agreement to
limit damages, bargained for under the UCC. Id. at 758. See note 13 supra.
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limitation.25 According to the Third Circuit, the district court
should have looked no further.
From the time of section 402A's introduction in 1964, there has
been concern as to what effect it should have in cases where its scope
might overlap existing law such as the Uniform Commercial Code.2"
Once a jurisdiction adopts tort liability under section 402A, it must
necessarily resolve any potential conflicts between 402A and the
UCC if it is to develop a clear and understandable rule of law for
the application of each. The overriding consideration in resolving
such conflicts should be the policy of the state making the decision.27
In predicting what the state supreme court would look to and con-
cluding that the Uniform Commercial Code should control a case
where a defective product caused only economic harm, the Post-
tape court only briefly referred to the policy considerations un-
derlying 402A and the UCC. Nonetheless, a closer analysis of the
origins and purposes of both 402A and the UCC supports the
Posttape court's finding that the state supreme court would not
have applied 402A to this type of transaction.
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted section 402A in
Webb v. Zern,5 the majority opinion did not address the possible
limitations of 402A. Justice Eagen, however, entered a caveat in a
concurring opinion that cases involving solely economic losses
should be decided exclusively under the Uniform Commercial
Code.29 Prior to Webb, in a concurring and dissenting opinion in
Miller v. Preitz, 30 Justice Jones of the supreme court also had sug-
gested that courts should employ section 402A only in cases involv-
ing injury to persons or property, relegating claims covering purely
economic loss to assumpsit actions.3 1 This equivocal authority being
25. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-719 (Purdon 1970).
26. See Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A
and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REv. 439 (1969); Franklin, supra note 17; Speidel, Products
Liability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. REv. 309 (1973); Titus, Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv. 713
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Titus]. These commentators analyzed the potential problems
with the overlap of 402A and the UCC and anticipated the very conflict which arose in
Posttape. All expressed grave concern for § 402A's potential to replace the UCC provisions
in such cases.
27. See Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Disclaimers and Warranties, 4
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 285, 287 (1963); Titus, supra note 26, at 782.
28. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
29. Id. at 428, 220 A.2d at 855 (concurring opinion).
30. 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
31. 422 Pa. at 398 n.19, 221 A.2d at 335 n.19 (concurring opinion). Justice Jones defined
1977
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the only directive from the state's highest court, federal courts
applying Pennsylvania law have considered the issue of the relation-
ship between 402A and the UCC, where only economic injury was
involved, to be unsettled in Pennsylvania.3 2 As commentators have
argued and the individual opinions implicitly recognize, to permit
section 402A to govern a case of purely economic loss arguably en-
croaches upon the legislative mandate of the Pennsylvania General
Assembly, which codified the UCC, since the UCC contains express
provisions for dealing with damages arising from commercial trans-
actions.33
The portions of the UCC dealing with warranty and contractual
limitations of damages have their origins in commercial transac-
tions where the user of a product might willingly accept the risk of
receiving a lower quality product because of convenience and speed
of delivery. 34 The concern in such a commercial setting is to protect
the consumer by preventing oppression and unfair surprise..35 Sec-
tion 402A, on the other hand, has its origins in cases involving
adulterated foods where a consumer would not find it reasonable to
accept a risk of harm.36 It is argued that the manufacturer who
markets the defective product can treat strict liability as a cost of
doing business.37 This policy of placing the risk on the one best able
to absorb the cost is an economic justification for liability without
fault, dealing only tangentially with the quality of the product. 31
Another purpose of 402A is to aid the consumer's recovery by cir-
cumventing the procedural limitations of sales law39 where physical
injuries are treated as consequential damages."
economic loss as the diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in quality
and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold.
32. See, e.g., Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 151 n.8
(3d Cir. 1974) (noting that the Pennsylvania appellate courts have not yet addressed the
question of the overlapping of § 402A and the provisions of the UCC).
33. See Murray, Pennsylvania Products Liability: A Clarification of the Search For a
Clear and Understandable Rule, 33 U. Pir. L. REv. 391, 427 (1972)[hereinafter cited as
Murray].
34. See Comment, Elimination of "Unreasonably Dangerous"from § 402A-The Price of
Consumer Safety?, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 25, 30-31, 36-37 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Consumer
Safety].
35. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 4; id. § 2-316, Comment 1.
36. See Titus, supra note 26, at 742-46.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A, Comment b (1965).
38. See Consumer Safety, supra note 34, at 31.
39. See James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 44, 192, 197 (1955); Titus, supra note
26, at 713-17.
40. See U.C.C. § 2-715.
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Yet section 402A has been extended beyond these original no-
tions. In actions for breach of implied warranty, 402A has been used
to justify the elimination of vertical privity4 and later horizontal
privity.42 If the opinion of Chief Justice Jones in Berkebile were
binding, it would represent a further expansion of the breadth of
402A in Pennsylvania; he argued that the "unreasonably danger-
ous" requirement of 402A should be eliminated. 3 The underlying
concern of Berkebile, Webb, and the cases eliminating vertical and
horizontal privity is to allow recovery to an injured consumer where
the safety of the product is in question.4 Posttape, however, is not
a case where the safety of the product is in dispute. Furthermore,
in commercial transactions where relief is sought for economic loss
in contrast to some physical injury, the UCC is designed to respond
to the expectations of the parties, whereas 402A is not.45 Thus, the
UCC should govern warranty and attempted limitations of damages
cases where arguably there is no social policy to be served by apply-
ing 402A.46 Since the UCC provides an adequate remedy for the
plaintiff in a case such as Posttape, there is seemingly no need to
extend 402A in order to afford the plaintiff an alternative means of
redress.
41. See Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968) (since the adoption of
§ 402A obliterated any logical basis for demanding vertical privity, a purchaser of a product
may maintain an action in assumpsit against a remote manufacturer for injuries caused by
breach of an implied warranty).
42. See Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974). Relying on
the same reasoning used in Kassab in repudiating the need for vertical privity, the court held
that a purchaser's employee who sustains personal injuries due to a defective product may
maintain an action in assumpsit against the seller for breach of warranty.
43. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
44. See Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 93, 337 A.2d 893, 898 (1975)
(Jones, C.J., & Nix, J.) (the underlying policy consideration in cases involving strict liability
is that the manufacturer is effectively the guarantor of his products' safety).
45. See notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra. See also Murray, supra note 33, at 427-
28.
46. Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1974);
2 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 133, 138 (1960) (since no needed protection would result from
such an extension of 402A, and there is no other social policy to be served by such an
extension, a commercial transaction should be controlled by the UCC rather than the
consumer-oriented § 402A). Despite the court's rejection of section 402A liability in Posttape,
the case does not represent a carte blanche for Kodak and other manufacturers to immunize
themselves from liability for their defective products. In Posttape, Kodak was not trying to
enforce an exculpatory clause to relieve itself from all liability. It was merely trying to enforce
what it contended to be a valid limitation of the extent of remedies available, which had been
freely contracted for under the UCC. 537 F.2d at 755.
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. Despite the Third Circuit's reasonable disposition of the 402A
issue, the Posttape opinion is not without its difficulties. In discuss-
ing the relationship between 402A and the UCC in cases involving
consequential damages which arise from a nondangerous impair-
ment of the quality of the product, Judge Weis seemed to express
the view that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would have had a
certain amount of discretion whether or not to look to the UCC to
decide the case had it been brought before it.47 Indeed, the court of
appeals' treatment of the limitation of remedies issue seemed to
evince a possible misunderstanding of a state court's responsibility
in applying its own statutory law: in noting the absence of a Penn-
sylvania ruling on the propriety of limiting damages under these
circumstances, the court observed that since there was no Pennsyl-
vania case law to the contrary, it would look to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code for guidance in deciding how Pennsylvania would have
resolved the issue."' This inclination could very well have resulted
from the court's concern for the historic growth of section 402A.
However, the Uniform Commercial Code is statutory law in Penn-
sylvania, and must be followed where applicable." Arguably, the
Postta~e court's duty was to determine how Pennsylvania would
apply the UCC, not to consider whether or not the UCC controlled
if there were no case law to the contrary. If the court was simply
looking for a definitive statement from the Pennsylvania courts on
how the state would apply the code sections on limitation of dam-
ages to support its determination, it failed to clearly articulate that
position. Whether this possible misunderstanding really existed and
if so whether it had any effect on the court's treatment of the 402A
issue is, however, doubtful. It remains for the state supreme court
to decide whether it agrees with the court of appeals' assessment of
how Pennsylvania law applies in these circumstances.
Thomas J. Kessinger
47. "The Code is there to be seen and we think the Pennsylvania courts would turn toward
it were they deciding the case sub judice." 537 F.2d at 756.
48. Id. at 755.
49. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
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